

رسالة من السفير الأمريكي مرفق بها مقال عن خروشوف
١٣ يوليو ١٩٦٠

القاهرة فى ١٣ يوليو ١٩٦٠

سىدى الرئيس،

إيماء إلى الحديث الذى دار بيننا مؤخرًا، عن لى أنك ربما تهتمون بإلقاء نظرة عابرة على المقال
المرفق، الذى كتبه مفكر ومحلل مرموق.

وتفضلوا سيادتكم بقبول فائق الاحترام وأطيب التمنيات.

فريدريك راينهارت

مرفق:


مقال بعنوان "أسطورة نيكيتا المكل بالقيود"، بقلم ألكساندر دالين.

الى فخامة الرئيس


جمال عبد الناصر

رئيس الجمهورية العربية المتحدة

القاهرة



استقبال السفير الأمريكى فى القاهرة وبرفقته أعضاء من مجلس النواب الأمريكى ١٩٥٩/١١/٢٦



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Cairo, July 13, 1960

My dear Mr. President:

In connection with our recent conversation, it occurred to me that you might be interested in glancing at the enclosed article written by a highly-regarded scholar and analyst.

I am, my dear Mr. President, with high respect and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

G. Frederick Reinhardt

Enclosure:

Article entitled "The Legend of the
Chained Nikita" by Alexander Dallin

His Excellency

Gamal Abdel Nasser,

President of the United Arab Republic,

CAIRO.

The Legend of the Chained Nikita

By Alexander Dallin

An inquiry into the bugbears, myths and illusions in Western analysis of Soviet affairs

THE BOTHERSOME U-2 story and the drama of the summit conference—that was none have provoked an orgy of speculation about Soviet motives and intentions. High officials and prominent newsmen have indulged in it more freely than at any time since Stalin's death. Such hypothesizing is both healthy and understandable; political analysis must be based on assumed probabilities even if access to the source is barred. What is startling and disturbing in the recent wave of reassessments is the ease with which the view has spread that Nikita Khrushchev was in fact constrained to act as he did; that he was (as one authority put it) "under strong pressure," or (as another writes) a "prisoner," a tool of nefarious hidden forces.

To the best of our knowledge, I submit, this is simply not so.

The legend of the chained Nikita includes three evil spirits, which operate either singly or together, depending on whose version you read. These are The Military, The Stalinists and The Chinese.

So far as the Soviet military is concerned, it will be well to remember, first of all, that it has never constituted a united political force. It has been faction-ridden and divided on important problems of military (and, implicitly, foreign) policy. But it has never been in a position to challenge the political leadership. Soviet marshals and generals are members of the Commu-


One of the most astute observers of the contemporary Russian scene, Alexander Dallin is associate professor at the Columbia University Russian Institute. In assessing Soviet foreign policy objectives, Dallin calls for a factual review of Communist strategy by analysis of Soviet ideology, public statement and past performance, so that the USSR's outlook and objectives, as well as its tactics, are clarified.

nist party, almost to a man, and they accept Party discipline in political affairs. From Frunze and Tukhachevsky to Zhukov (surely, men more powerful and more popular than the Konevs and Malinovskys of today), the military leaders have been, in the last analysis, at the mercy of the dictator, who has been able to dispose of them as he saw fit. There is no evidence whatever that this relationship has changed.

If in 1955-56 there could be any doubt about the priority of the Communist party, it was emphatically and unmistakably removed in 1957. The tightening of controls and the struggle against "revisionism" included among its various manifestations the reinforcement of political control over the armed forces. Since then the priority of the Party—in word and in fact—has explicitly been raised to unprecedented heights. And the image of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky following Khrushchev's every step in and out of Paris as a watchdog of the hidden junta in Moscow is too silly to take seriously.

As for the Stalinists, the question is of course, "Who are they?" Invariably, speculation centers on Mikhail Suslov as the leader or spokesman of this "camp." Granting for the sake of argument that Suslov represents a "tougher" line than Khrushchev, what are his levers of power and who are the others who back him in the top echelons of the Kremlin? Either one grants the reality of some measure of collective decision-making there—and then Khrushchev's complete and systematic packing and control of the Party Presidium, Central Committee and Secretariat must be clearly recognized (the changing relationship among these three bodies is irrelevant for our purposes, as Khrushchev now fully controls all three); or else one assumes that numbers and majorities do not matter in these bodies—and then there would be no reason to believe that a hostile but victorious Suslov would continue to tolerate Khrushchev in power if he could dispense with him (much as the Molotov-Malenkov bloc would have dispensed with him in 1957).

If one trend emerges unmistakably from the various personnel shifts in the Soviet Government and Communist party leadership in recent years, it is the almost uninterrupted consolidation of control by the Khrushchev machine and the elimination of any power base for a possible challenger. The latest shifts, including Frol Kozlov's and Leonid Brezhnev's reappointments, merely underscore



THE 'EVIL GENIES': MALINOVSKY (THE MILITARY), MAO (THE CHINESE), SUSLOV (THE STALINISTS)

this trend. Of the old-timers, the only ones who remain are Anastas Mikoyan (usually considered either opportunistic or relatively "soft") and the virtually impotent Kliment Voroshilov and Otto Kuusinen. Just about everyone else is an appointee of the Khrushchev era. As one runs down the list of the three top bodies, one fails to see more than a few names of men who could turn, or could have turned, on the *khoziain*. To be sure, a "Khrushchev man" may turn against him, just as Khrushchev himself turned against Stalin after his death. But we are talking about probabilities or, better yet, evidence and clues. And, here, the thesis of the Stalinists' ascendancy does not stand up. Unless, that is, one is satisfied (as one well-known correspondent says) that this trend must be taken on faith and evidence for it may not be apparent for months.

As usual, the role of China is most obscure. Without going into the complexities of the Sino-Soviet relationship, it may be said as a general proposition that the Chinese tail does not wag the Soviet dog (nor, for that matter, vice versa). For years, differences between the two powers have demonstrably existed over a wide range of issues, without seriously jeopardizing their al-

liance. These issues have included the inevitability of war, the cult of the individual, tactics toward the United States, the communes, the availability of nuclear weapons and no doubt a good many others as well. But I know of no shred of evidence showing that Khrushchev has now, after years of modulating and mitigating Sino-Soviet differences, been compelled to accept Peking's views, on this or on any other matter.

The permutations and combinations of the three evil genies add little of substance. Thus, the attempt to link Vyacheslav Molotov, as the leading Stalinist (which he was) in his Outer Mongolian quasi-exile, to Chinese Government head Liu Shao-chi in an alleged anti-Khrushchev drive is an artificial construct which has been tried and found wanting more than once before. (For that matter, Peking's publication of Molotov's speeches and statements, which Moscow failed to print, is by no means unprecedented, as recent comment has suggested: Precisely the same was true, for instance, in November 1958.) Moreover, the notion of an explicit coalition of Stalinists, Militarists and Chinese Communists joining hands to choke Nikita fails to reflect much insight into totalitarian politics.

All this is not a critique of Krem-

linology. Close scrutiny of Soviet sources, even frequency count and pecking order, can be essential for hints about intramural politics. Nor is this to suggest in any way that there are not real tensions and differences in Soviet society and the Soviet regime. Of course there are, and the image of a homogeneous totalitarian apparatus is as unrealistic as the thesis I am trying to contest.

Disagreements at the apex of totalitarian regimes are endemic. In the Soviet case, we know that such disagreements have existed, in recent years, over such issues as the relative priority of consumer goods, the long-range effect of foreign aid, the universal fatality of nuclear warfare and the possibility and desirability of relaxing the cold war. It is plausible to assume that such differences were present in March-April 1960 when the general lines of Soviet foreign policy were reviewed. The confusion of American voices is not likely to have clarified matters for the Muscovite observers. There were, and no doubt are, real divergences about proper Soviet strategy in foreign affairs.

Similarly, the breakdown of the Paris conference has no doubt pleased Peking and produced greater concord between the two leading

Communist powers. But this is a by-product of the story, not its cause. The differences between Moscow and Peking continue to be as great as ever, it seems. In the aftermath of his exhibition of vilification and vulgarity, Khrushchev continues to refrain from signing the peace treaty with East Germany; he submits new proposals on disarmament-by-stages and continues negotiations on nuclear test suspension; he continues to promote a variety of cultural, commercial and scientific exchanges with the West—the U.S. included. There is no surrender to Chinese dragons, whatever the balance of Soviet decisions.

And the same is true of the military. No doubt, there is some truth in the recent analysis of the large number of Soviet officers facing demobilization and viewing their loss of status and income with something less than enthusiasm. No doubt Khrushchev's militant stance helped to reassure those in Russia, in and out of uniform, who have been bothered by the gnawing fear that the Man in Moscow might be taking his "peaceful coexistence" seriously, or might let his impulses jeopardize rational defense requirements. But all this has nothing to do with officers forcing a decision upon him. It is he who has the ultimate authority to decide about crucial shifts of military policy and personnel, not the other way around.

There is, in other words, no one to challenge his effective *control*. Others can suggest, argue, make themselves heard—and they can do so more successfully and with greater impunity than in Stalin's days. At times, Khrushchev is apparently prepared to listen to them. But no man and no faction can *force* its will on the Khrushchev machine.

Nothing is impossible in Soviet affairs. But I suggest that if those who detect an inhibited Russian Prometheus should be proved right, it will be for the wrong reasons—or rather for reasons not now in the public domain. In the absence of

inside information, we must probe Soviet intentions by a process of triangulation which includes Soviet ideology, Soviet pronouncements and the record of past Soviet performance. All three militate strongly against the view which I have been contesting here. Neither the theory (or, to use Nathan Leites' term, the "operational code") nor the record of Bolshevik behavior over half a century would permit tolerating a leader who is anything less than a complete master of all his own decisions.

As for Soviet pronouncements, Khrushchev would not have made his statement of May 28 if a real crisis of confidence or control had been involved. No such denial was made, for instance, when either the Molotov-Malenkov group or Marshal Georgi Zhukov or, later, Nikolai Bulganin were ousted. Now, Khrushchev confidently ridicules those "silly allegations" which contend that he "is being opposed by army officers and generals," or that "other socialist countries are pressing the Soviet Union to give up the policy of *détente* and other things of this kind." And if Mikoyan were about to be axed (as some commentators have suggested), Khrushchev would scarcely have ridiculed such speculation by relating that Mikoyan had


just invited him to his vacation ground in the Caucasus.

Quite the contrary. The style of the Paris performance smacked not only of Bolshevik tactics but reflected Khrushchev's personal amalgam of bullying and smiling, his immense flexibility and the characteristic ease with which he can shift gears suddenly, completely, from subject to subject, from vulgar diatribe to humility, from insult and insecurity to sweet reasonableness—and back. Anyone who has seen the man in action for a few hours can confirm that the recent performances were fully and typically his own, both in content and in form.

The speed and ease with which the image of Khrushchev as the instrument of some grey eminence has spread in this country reflects, I believe, more about ourselves than about Soviet reality. Some who have swallowed it are either unwilling to re-examine their assumptions about the nature of "coexistence," or else cannot reconcile the memory of the burly politician, who last fall toured the U.S. with a smile and a simile and a sandstorm of hope, with the angry old man in Paris. That so many responsible men, after years of following and interpreting Soviet affairs closely in this country, should have adopted this inversion of wishful thinking strikes me as more than deplorable.

To assert that Khrushchev is being forced to act as he does is no sounder than it was, 20 years ago, to portray Hitler as a tool of the German General Staff or of the Krupps; no less far-fetched and no less dangerous than the present Soviet insistence that Eisenhower (or any other American political figure) is a tool of the Pentagon and/or Wall Street.

The present mood reveals above all—if my line of argument is correct—our continued failure to focus on, and accept as given, the long-range nature of Soviet outlook and objectives, and to see against this background the skillful but by no means unerring flexibility of Moscow's hand.



MIKOYAN: INVITATION TO THE BOSS